1960s. 2 Indians complain about religious statues and other things of value taken from temples during the British occupation of their country. 3 Australian Aborigines, Native
Americans and Canadians are demanding the return of bones and other cultural relics held by museums in Britain and the United States. 4 Restitution is the restoration to its rightful owner of something that was unjustly taken. Some people oppose restitution claims for cultural artefacts and relics by denying that those who make the demands are the rightful owners. Others argue that the property rights of the claimants have been superseded by the passage of time or other circumstances. Some opponents suggest that restitution claims, even if legitimate, will often be overridden by other considerations. Leading museums of Europe and America have recently issued a statement which declares that the 'diverse and multifaceted'
collections of museums serve the people of all nations and should not be compromised for the sake of the interests of one group of people. 5 This survey suggests that there are four kinds of issues that come up in debates about return of cultural artefacts. The first set focus on the notion of cultural property itself: what it means to claim something as 'cultural property', how this claim might be justified, what rights are being invoked and who is entitled to invoke them. The second set of issues concern the validity of claims for restitution -which (if any) can be justified by an appeal to cultural property rights. Issues of the third kind are raised by the defenders of museums who argue that there values which can override restitution claims even when they are well supported by an appeal to rights of cultural property. The fourth concern the relation of these values to debates about the return of artefacts and relics to their place of origin. Do they provide convincing grounds for keeping these things in museums or can they be used to bolster the case of those who think they should be returned?
I will argue that there is a plausible conception of cultural property which can be used to justify some restitution claims. But many demands for restitution cannot be so justified (including, I believe, the Greek claim to the Parthenon Marbles). A case for restitution can be more or less strong, and other values can sometimes prevail over cultural property rights. By invoking these values museum directors cannot justify retaining all of the artefacts and relics now in their collections. However, I will argue that they are wrong to suppose that by acceding to some demands they are embarking on a course which will make it impossible for museums to serve the purposes for which they were created.
Cultural Property
Cultural property is the property of a collectivity. In international disputes about cultural property it is almost always states which claim right of possession over artefacts, monuments, and relics. The basis for their claims is that these things are found in, or were taken from, their territory. Cultural property, so conceived, is a resource that states have a right to control. From a moral point of view this conception of cultural property is unsatisfactory. It gives the claims of states unjustified precedence over the claims of other collectivities. If a state forces an indigenous community to surrender artefacts to a national museum then surely this counts as a case of unjust dispossession. It favours collectivities that are territorial over those that are not. Why shouldn't a non-territorial organisation, like a religious group, be able to claim cultural property? Most important, the idea that that cultural property is a national resource fails to consider how claims to cultural artefacts might differ from claims to things whose value is merely economic.
The following characterisation of cultural property seems to accord with most people's understanding of what it is.
Something is the cultural property of a collectivity if and only if a) it was legitimately acquired by the collective or its members -that is, not taken without consent or justification from others -or possession of it has been made legitimate by changes in circumstances; b) the item plays an important role in the religious, cultural or political life of people of the collectivity by functioning as a symbol of collective ideals, a source of identity for its members, as a ceremonial object, a focus of historical meaning, an expression of their achievements, or as a link with founders or ancestors.
To the extent that individuals value their membership in the collectivity, they will be predisposed to value its cultural property. They will want to protect it, preserve it and pass it on to their descendants or successors. They may think that they have an obligation to do these things. The value to individuals of being able to exercise collective control over those monuments, artefacts or relics that satisfy the criteria constitutes the justification for cultural property rights. 6 The exercise of these rights typically takes the form of restrictions on the activities of individuals and other collectivities. 
Cultural Property and Restitution
If something is unjustly taken from its owners, then those wronged can demand reparation. But it does not follow that the wrongdoer is obliged to restore the property to them -particularly if time has passed and conditions have changed. Suppose that a state uses its position of domination over the affairs of another nation to quarry and remove from its territory a precious vein of marble. The nation, now independent, lacks resources it would have had for economic development if the dispossession had not occurred. An injustice has been done and the perpetrator owes some form of reparation. But this does not mean that it has to give back the marble that it took. What it owes, presumably, is compensation for the economic loss that the victim suffered. Artefacts can also be economic assets and it seems reasonable to think that those who unjustly removed them from the territory of a nation or a tribe ought to pay compensation. A moral case for restitution -for restoration of the objects taken -thus depends on more than a plausible claim to possession on the basis of territory. There must be reason to believe that these artefacts were, and continue to be, important to the collective life of those from whom they were unjustly taken.
In some cases the demand for restitution is not difficult to justify. Take, for example, the crowns, manuscripts and chalices pillaged from Ethiopia by the British in the 19 th century. These were clearly regarded by the Ethiopians as having great religious and national significance. The emperor at the time had done his best to protect them from harm by securing them in his strongest fortress. As soon as they were able, the Ethiopians asked for their return (and in fact the British did return a few minor treasures). It seems reasonable to conclude that these artefacts were (and are) Ethiopia's cultural property and that they were unjustly removed. Is there any legitimate way of resisting such a claim?
Sometimes opponents of restitution argue that some removals were not unjust by the standards of the time, and suggest that present possessors have no need to make restitution just because standards have changed. 8 The Ethiopian treasures were captured as the result of a military siege and pillaging was once regarded as a legitimate practice in war. But if we now believe that it is wrong to pillage cultural property during war (especially if the justice of the war is doubtful) then we must also believe that it was wrong for the British to take away Ethiopian cultural property. If our national predecessors did wrong then we cannot escape the requirement of restitution.
A more convincing reason for rejecting at least some restitution claims is the conviction, commonsense to many people, that the right to restitution is superseded in the course of time. The right will have ceased to exist if the collectivity from whom the artefact was taken no longer exists. But even if the group survives, its claim to lost cultural property may weaken over time. Waldron suggests that a person's claim to a lost property diminishes as it ceases to be central to her existence and life plans. She is forced to adjust to life without it, and once that adjustment is made, she no longer has a need that requires its return. This does not mean that she is owed nothing for the injustice she is suffered. Those who have wronged her owe her at least an apology -perhaps also compensation. But they are no longer required to return to her the possession she lost. down from one generation to another, and its meaning is bound up with their desire to perpetuate their traditions and practices. In this respect, a piece of cultural property is like a family heirloom. When a property has the status of an heirloom we assume that it can be subject to a legitimate demand for restitution several generations after dispossession has occurred. Since many collectivities, for example, nation-states and religious organisations, retain their identity far longer than families it seems reasonable to assume that their right of restitution is also more enduring.
A collectivity's right to restitution does not last forever. Groups change their practices. New lands become sacred; new victories or achievements are celebrated; different objects take on meaning. There is no way of determining a time span after which an artefact or relic can no longer be deemed important to a group's practices. Each case has to be decided on its merits and a resolution will sometimes be difficult.
However, most current restitution claims concern cultural property that was taken away less than 200 years ago or not much earlier. In most of these cases, it would be difficult to argue that the claim has been superseded by the effects of time.
The Nor is it a problem that Iceland was not an independent political society at the time that the manuscripts were taken away. An unorganised collectivity can be the owner of cultural property, and it is reasonable to suppose that the state of Iceland, when it came into existence, inherited the rights of the Icelandic community. The problem is that that the manuscripts were not the cultural property of this community at the time when they were sold and taken away. It was only much later that they acquired symbolic importance. A claim to cultural property cannot be made retrospectively. This does not mean that we have to accept the Danish point of view -that the return of the manuscripts was a supererogatory act of generosity. Denmark was a harsh colonial master and it is reasonable to think that it owed Icelanders reparation. Giving them something that they valued highly could be thought of as an appropriate way to make recompense. But this is a different issue.
Greece's claim for the restitution of the Parthenon Marbles seems to suffer from the same defect. There is no convincing evidence that the Greeks, at the time when Lord
Elgin's employees were doing their work, regarded the Marbles, or the Parthenon itself, as their cultural property. Hitchens points out that members of the Greek liberation movement had in the past protested about the removal of antiquities, and that some Greeks did mourn the disappearance of the Marbles. 12 But witnesses reported that there was no public outcry or protest during the period when the work of removal was done, and that many Greeks welcomed the presence of the foreigners and opportunities for employment. 13 Hobsbawm says that the glories of ancient Greece were irrelevant to the Greeks who were fighting for their independence from Turkish rule. 'They fought as Christians against Muslim unbelievers.' 14 The evidence thus suggests that their adoption of the Parthenon and the Marbles as important national symbols was a later development.
It does not follow that Lord Elgin did no wrong to the Greeks. He can be blamed for not consulting them, for dealing only with those whom they regarded as their oppressors. He can, perhaps, be blamed for extracting a valuable resource from their territory. Some form of recompense may be owed to the Greeks for these injustices, but the British are not obliged to make restitution for the theft of cultural property.
My account of cultural property puts an obstacle in the way of restitution claims that many people think are valid. There are two strategies that supporters of these claims might use to circumvent it. Neither of them is promising.
The first argument goes as follows. 'Oppressed peoples are unable to engage in collective acts of self-reflection that would lead them to recognise something as their cultural property. Lack of self-determination is what stood in the way of Greeks or Icelanders satisfying the conditions for cultural property ownership. If they had not been oppressed they would have satisfied these conditions, as later developments indicate. To refuse to recognise their right to restitution is to add insult to injuring by punishing people for being victims of repression.' The problem with this argument is that it depends heavily on contrary to fact statements for which there neither is nor can be evidence.
What a group of people would have done in the absence of a history of oppression is impossible to determine. Reasoning that depends on speculation seems too weak to support a case for restitution.
The second, more common, argument depends on the idea that artefacts can belong to a collectivity even when their members are not yet aware of this fact. Some people believe both that their nation existed long before its people developed a national consciousness, and that some artefacts belong to the nation simply because they express eternal national qualities or aspirations. One problem arising from the second belief is how to establish that an artefact counts as an expression of a particular national essence.
Why should we regard the Norse manuscripts as essentially belonging to the Icelandic nation or the Parthenon Marbles to the Greeks? But the first belief raises the more serious problem. The idea of a nation as a primeval community with an essence that remains the same through time is a myth. 15 Nations are created in the course of political struggles, or as the result of deliberate political policies. Even members are likely to be in disagreement about the properties that distinguish their nation from others or in their reasons for valuing their national identity. Given that this is so, nothing about their nation or its history seems to give them the right to regard an artefact or a relic as having always been theirs.
Restitution and Values For Humanity
Appeals to rights of cultural property support some restitution claims but not others.
However many of those who think that museums ought to resist demands for restitution are claiming that there are values at stake that can justify refusing demands for restitution even when they are legitimate. They are not pitting the claims of one collectivity against another. They are not claiming that the acquisitions of museum have become over time the cultural property of the museum or the people of their country -that, for example, the Theories of justice allow that a government is entitled to limit property rights for the sake of fulfilling requirements of justice and other important objectives. But if a government were to deny these entitlements whenever it believes that doing so would serve the good of all (the greatest happiness, for example), it could be accused of violating rights that underwrite the freedom and self-realisation of individuals.
If an artefact does indeed play an important role in the traditions and practices of a collectivity or in the way that individuals identify themselves as members then it is difficult to deny to them the full exercise of their entitlements. This is true even if the use that the collective makes of an artefact destroys its human values or makes it impossible for them to be appreciated. Suppose that in our tribe we have a tradition that requires us to spend each decade constructing a beautiful temple which we then destroy as a ceremonial offering to the gods. Though outsiders might regard this destruction as regrettable or even wrong they cannot deny us the right to do it. Nor one can we deny the right of members of an orthodox Jewish synagogue to refuse to open up their temple so that scholars or tourists can study and admire their ancient Ark of the Covenant.
Similarly, it would be wrong to force an Aboriginal group to reveal its secret knowledge or to put on display objects that it uses in its secret ceremonies, however interesting these things are to scholarship. If an artefact is central to a collectivity's identity then its right to restitution does not depend on whether returning the object is the best way of protecting human values.
This insistence on the strength of cultural property rights is likely to be contested, particularly in those cases where a collectivity is bent on destroying artefacts. Many people were outraged by the Taliban's destruction of ancient Buddhist statues in Bamiyan. They believed that the Taliban had no right to commit such acts. Similarly, many people condemn the destruction of religious artworks and artefacts that occurred in many countries during the Reformation. But if destruction was wrong, then surely the rights of collectivities over cultural property cannot be so absolute.
The actions of the Taliban provide no counterexample to a defence of cultural property rights. The Buddhist statutes did not belong to its traditions or practices, and thus were not its cultural property. The fact that these artefacts were located on Afghan soil did not give it the moral right to destroy. It is much more difficult to deny to
Protestants the right to destroy those things in their own churches which they had come to believe were evil or a hindrance to worship. We might now call their acts vandalism, but this is consistent with thinking they were acting within their rights. Their position, in other words, has much in common with that of the tribe which destroys its own handiwork.
Should we draw a distinction between cultural items that were produced by members of a collectivity and those which fall into its possession because it inhabits land or uses buildings that once belonged to another collectivity? A collectivity, it might be said, has a clear and unconditional title to objects it has produced, but not over monuments and artworks produced by other collectivities: in particular, not over products of ancient civilisations -those things for which the label 'property of humankind' seems most apt. What was wrong with the Taliban's actions, according to this way of thinking, is that they destroyed relics of an older culture, and in so far as the Protestants destroyed artefacts they had inherited from other collectivities, they were acting illegitimately. But this proposal won't do. 
Values and Location
In those cases where values for humanity are the main, or the only consideration, in determining how artefacts should be treated, museums can generally make a good case for holding and retaining their treasures. Museums are good environments for advancing scholarship, educating the public and preserving aesthetic values. 18 However, it has sometimes been argued that these values can be better served by returning artefacts to their place of origin. Hitchens argues that this is so in the case of the Parthenon Marbles.
Either all the marbles could be assembled in one museum in London, or they could be marshalled in a museum in Athens next to the Parthenon. But to keep them in two places, one of them quite sundered from the Parthenon and its context, seems bizarre and irrational as well as inartistic. 19 Since the Parthenon and its context is in Athens it follows that the Marbles should be located there.
Aesthetic values can sometimes be well served by returning an object to its place of origin. If a carving was made to fit into a frieze then its removal not only diminishes the value of the site but also of the object taken and the aesthetic value of both would be enhanced by returning it to its place (where that is possible). Scholarly values can sometimes be advanced by leaving an artefact in its context. This is obviously true of objects found in tombs, and a good reason for forcing museums to give back items pillaged from archaeological sites is that the requirement might discourage grave robbing. 20 Viewing an artefact in its place of origin may provide a richer educational experience than seeing it in a museum. The Goldmans argue that monuments can have a great educational value because of their effect on those who visit them. 21 Actually being in a place where a historical event occurred, walking through a cathedral that people have worshipped in for centuries, or seeing artefacts in the place for which they were intended can bring it about that what a visitor learns is more deeply felt, more personally relevant and more memorable. This is perhaps one of the values that Hitchens thinks will be served by returning the Marbles to Athens.
However, the case for return can be more or less strong, and often an appeal to human values will favour the position of the museum directors. Sometimes location seems to make no difference at all to the value of an object. This is likely to be true of many objects that museums collect -figurines, vases, jewellery, manuscripts, etc.
Sometimes restoration is impossible. The Marbles cannot be put back on the Parthenon, and it is not obvious how displaying them in a museum near the Parthenon enhances their aesthetic worth. Sometimes reasons for return may be more than balanced by reasons for leaving artefacts in museums. If carvings and reliefs were to be returned to the Buddhist temples in Chinese Turkistan from which they were taken this would enhance their aesthetic worth but it would make them much less accessible to scholars and tourists. 22 People can get a rich educational experience out seeing an artefact in or near the site for which it was created, but they can also learn a lot by being able to compare it with artefacts from other times and cultures -an opportunity that museums are good at providing. Which experience is better is probably very much a matter of individual predilections. It is not obvious, for example, that seeing the Marbles in Athens is better from an educational point of view than seeing them in the British Museum This discussion indicates that there is no general principle which determines where artefacts should be located if values for humanity are to be well served. Each case has to be considered on its merits. Sometimes a survey of the relevant considerations will lead to the conclusion that a return is justified, but in many other cases (including, I think, the case of the Parthenon Marbles) there will be no compelling argument for return.
Museums are not always the best custodians of objects of values to humanity. But it is likely in most cases that they are. Neither appeals to these values nor claims based on cultural property rights seem to be serious threats to the existence of museums or to the bulk of their collections. Museum officials can recognise the right of Aborigines to get back the bones of their ancestors and the right of Ethiopians to repossess their cultural property without supposing that they are thereby committed to give in to every demand for restitution. They can acknowledge that it would better for aesthetic, scholarly or
